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1 
Challenges in Achieving 
Universal Healthcare in 
Ireland 
 
Abstract 
The World Health Organization has advocated universal healthcare as the best 
means of improving global health. However achieving universal healthcare is not 
without challenges: from defining the goal of universal healthcare to identifying 
the most appropriate methods to achieve it. Ireland is unique in the EU in not 
having universal coverage of primary care. In 2011, a newly-elected government 
committed to the development of a universal, single-tier health service, to be 
financed by a new system of Universal Health Insurance (UHI) provided by 
multiple, competing private insurers. A White Paper published in 2014 outlined 
the proposed UHI model. However, in 2015 in response to publication of a study 
of the potential cost implications of the proposed UHI model, the Government 
abandoned this model.  
 
This paper reviews recent policy debate on the reform of Irish healthcare; and 
examines how universality is defined in healthcare, the rationale for its adoption 
and approaches to financing universal healthcare. Building on discussion of the 
White Paper model of UHI and its potential cost implications, the paper examines 
issues that need to be addressed in any alternative system design. Using the 
WHO’s framework for assessment of the dimensions of universal healthcare, we 
find that the White Paper model could have increased costs without achieving 
universality and equitable access. We recommend that future policy should aim 
to increase the dimensions of universal coverage (population coverage, services 
coverage and pooled payment to replace user fees), while building from the 
existing Irish system in the most cost-effective way possible. While 
acknowledging that development of a comprehensive roadmap to universality is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the paper explores some potential routes to 
advance towards universality. These are: the extension of the present tax-
financed primary care system: and addressing two-tier access to hospital care by 
either a new public purchaser of hospital care or introducing compulsory private 
insurance for elective hospital care in a system designed to ensure payment 
according to ability to pay and Government control of insurers’ margins and other 
costs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, a newly-elected coalition government committed to reform of the Irish 
healthcare system, to include the development of a universal, single-tier health 
service, partly funded by Universal Health Insurance (UHI). A proposed model of 
UHI provided by multiple, competing private insurers was outlined in a White 
Paper published in 2014 (Department of Health, 2014). However, following the 
publication of an analysis of potential costs associated with this approach (Wren 
et al., 2015), the Minister for Health stated that these costs were ‘not acceptable’ 
although the Government remained committed to universal healthcare 
(Department of Health, 2015). During the general election campaign of early 
2016, the Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, restated his commitment to UHI as the 
financing model for universal healthcare but suggested that the nature of the UHI 
system required further research (RTÉ Radio, 2016). The Programme for 
Government published by Mr Kenny’s new minority Government in May 2016 did 
not mention UHI; however it did note that further work is required to identify the 
best way to finance universal healthcare (Department of the Taoiseach, 2016).  
 
The aim of this paper is to identify and discuss the issues that arise in 
implementing universal healthcare in Ireland. In this analysis, we distinguish 
between the objective of achieving a universal healthcare system and the 
approach to financing this system. Whether UHI or another form of financing is 
adopted, the financing mechanism is only one aspect of the design of a universal 
healthcare system which removes financial barriers to achieving equitable access 
to necessary care. The next section reviews recent and developing policy debate 
on the reform of Irish healthcare to achieve universality. Section 3 examines how 
universality is defined in healthcare, the rationale for its adoption and 
approaches to financing universal healthcare. Section 4 discusses the White 
Paper model of UHI, and the methods applied in and findings from the Wren et 
al. (2015) UHI cost analysis. Section 5 identifies issues that need to be addressed 
in any alternative reform designed to achieve universality in Irish healthcare and 
explores potential approaches to advancing towards universality based on the 
existing Irish system. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Ireland has the only European health system that does not offer universal 
coverage of primary care (Thomson et al., 2012). There is evidence of financial 
barriers to access, unmet need for care and relatively high user charges for 
primary healthcare, when compared to other EU countries (O'Reilly et al., 2007; 
Kringos et al., 2013). Privately insured patients or those who can afford to pay 
privately can more rapidly access diagnostics and a first specialist appointment 
which facilitate speedier access to public acute hospital treatment; while such 
 
3 
insured or paying patients can also access the private hospital sector, which 
expanded rapidly in the early 2000s supported by Government subsidies (Tussing 
and Wren, 2006). 
 
These and other inequities and financial barriers to access in Irish healthcare arise 
in a complex system, with mixed public and private financing and delivery; and 
multiple eligibility categories. Healthcare financing relies predominantly on 
general taxation, which accounted for an estimated 77 per cent of total financing 
in 2013, with out-of-pocket payments by individuals and private health insurance 
(PHI) contributing an estimated 12 and 9 per cent respectively (Wren et al., 
2015). Medical cards are issued to individuals on a means-tested basis. The full 
medical card entitles the holder (and dependants) to free primary and public 
hospital services although this comprehensive eligibility was diluted by the 
introduction of co-payments for prescribed medications in 2010. General 
Practitioner (GP) services are provided in a private market, with GPs reimbursed 
by the state for medical cardholders’ care. The ‘GP Visit’ medical card, introduced 
in 2005, entitles the holder (and dependants) to free GP visits only. In certain 
cases, individuals who are otherwise ineligible for a full medical/GP Visit card may 
be granted a card on a ‘discretionary’ basis, if they have particular health needs 
which would cause them undue hardship (HSE, 2015). Between 2001 and 2008, 
medical cards were also issued to all individuals aged 70 years and above: means-
testing was re-introduced for medical cards for this age group in 2009 and, in a 
partial restoration of coverage, eligibility for GP Visit cards was extended to the 
non-medical cardholders in this group in 2015. Eligibility for GP Visit cards was 
expanded to all children aged under six in 2015. The proportion of the population 
covered by medical and GP Visit cards fluctuates depending on the relationship 
between income thresholds and the income distribution. Between 2005 and 
2015, the proportion of the population covered by cards increased from 29 to 47 
per cent (Wren et al., 2015; HSE, 2016). 
 
Individuals without a full medical card or GP Visit card are required to pay the full 
private charge for GP services; and are further required to pay the full cost of 
prescription medications, with reimbursement if this cost exceeds the threshold 
of €144 per month (for an individual or household). Non-cardholders must also 
pay public hospital in-patient bed charges and self-referred Emergency 
Department visit charges.1 Private hospital services such as private or semi-
private accommodation and consultant-delivered care (purchased by private fee 
payment) are available in public and private hospitals for those who are willing to 
pay significant out-of-pocket charges but are more typically financed by private 
 
                                                          
1  ED charge is €100 per visit; public overnight charge is €75 per night up to a maximum of €750 in one year 
www.hse.ie/eng/services/list/3/hospitals/Hospitalcharges.html.  
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health insurance. In 2015, approximately 46 per cent of the population held PHI 
which mainly provides cover for hospital services and which is purchased largely 
to avoid long waits for public care (MillwardBrown, 2016).2  
 
The 2011 Programme for Government made a historic commitment to a 
healthcare system ‘designed according to the European principle of social 
solidarity: access will be according to need and payment will be according to 
ability to pay’ (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011: 31). Central planks in this 
programme were the reform of two-tier access to hospital care and the 
introduction of GP care free at the point of use. The commitment of the 2011-
2016 Government to re-designing the Irish healthcare system to accord with 
European principles of social solidarity overturned the conventional wisdom in 
the politics of Irish healthcare. A Labour Party policy in the general election of 
2002 to remove payment at the point of use for GP services had been 
characterised as a ‘crazy, loony-Left’ proposal by the then Attorney General and 
subsequent Tánaiste, Michael McDowell (O'Connor, 2002). This not uncommon 
Irish perception of support for universality in healthcare as an extreme political 
stance rather than a European norm (Council of the European Union, 2006) can 
be traced to a fault line that developed in Irish health policy in 1951 when Ireland 
diverged from the contemporary European development of universal healthcare 
systems (Barrington, 1987; Wren, 2003). The then Minister for Health, Dr Noel 
Browne, resigned after the inter-party Government capitulated to Catholic 
Church and medical opposition to the removal of fees for GP care for children 
aged under 16 (Whyte, 1980). The first Irish Government to re-espouse this aim 
was the Government elected in 2011 – 60 years later. 
 
In the decade preceding the election of the 2011 Government, the case for 
reforming the system of access to Irish healthcare had been researched and 
developed in academic studies and political parties’ policies. Evidence supporting 
movement from payment at the point of use to some form of pre-payment 
(whether financed by tax or insurance) had been presented in the work of the 
Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector (Brick et 
al., 2010; Ruane, 2010). Constrained by terms of reference which required its 
recommendations to be revenue neutral, the Expert Group recommended an 
extension of the tax-financed medical card system to reduce the level of out-of-
pocket payments for GP care and prescribed medications, with subsidies 
designed to favour groups on lower incomes or with particular health need 
(Ruane, 2010). The case for social insurance funding of a universal healthcare 
 
                                                          
2  While 51 per cent advanced the cost of treatment as the main driver for their purchase of PHI in MillwardBrown 
(2016), the cost of private health insurance in general exceeds the cost of reimbursed public charges, which suggests 
that achieving access to private care (in public or private hospitals) is the implicit driver; 58 per cent agreed with the 
statement that ‘Having PHI means you can skip the queues’. 
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system in Ireland had been separately presented and refined in a series of studies 
(Thomas et al., 2006; 2008; 2010). 
 
In parallel to these academic studies, policy documents published by the two 
opposition parties who entered government together in 2011 had espoused 
variants of insurance-financed universal access to healthcare. Fine Gael policy 
evolved to propose a UHI model financed via competing private insurers based on 
the 2006 reforms in the Netherlands (Fine Gael, 2000; 2002; 2009). Labour Party 
policy evolved to propose a UHI model in which hospital care would be financed 
via multiple, largely public insurers and primary care would be financed by social 
insurance, with the primary care reform preceding the hospital reform (The 
Labour Party, 2000; 2001; 2011). The 2011 Programme for Government 
represented an ambiguous compromise between these two policies and 
interpretation of the programme created tensions within the Government (Dáil 
Debates, 2012; Loughlin, 2016). 
 
Progress on reform was slow: the White Paper providing greater detail on the 
proposed UHI model design was published in April 2014, over three years into the 
life of the Government (Department of Health, 2014); while the Department of 
Health-commissioned study into the potential costs of this model was published 
in November 2015, three months before the general election (Wren et al., 2015). 
During this Government’s term (2011-2016), the effect of the fiscal crisis on 
health budgets and staffing was to increase out-of-pocket payments for 
healthcare and rationing via public waiting lists, thereby reducing the pre-existing 
dimensions of universal coverage in the Irish healthcare system (Thomson et al., 
2012; Burke et al., 2015). The most visible, concrete advance on the reform path 
mapped by the Programme for Government was the extension of free GP care to 
children under the age of six and its restoration to all over 70-year-olds in 2015. 
This age-based approach to extending eligibility for care without fees replaced 
the Programme’s proposed gradual achievement of universal free GP care, 
commencing with extension of eligibility to groups with defined health needs, an 
approach which was informed by the Expert Group’s recommendations but which 
had encountered legal and definitional obstacles (The Labour Party, 2011; Cullen, 
2013; White, 2013). While the publication of the costs of the White Paper UHI 
model was greeted as evidence of the infeasibility of this financing approach and 
the need for further research (Department of Health, 2015; Fine Gael, 2016), 
there has to date been little discussion about the implications of these findings 
for the development of future strategies for achievement of universal healthcare 
in Ireland. The terms of reference of the research study, which analysed the cost 
implications of the model, had limited its scope: the authors recommended that 
before the introduction of a system of UHI, there should be further analysis of 
whether a proposed UHI model would improve health outcomes, achieve equity, 
 
6 
be cost-effective and whether its implementation would be feasible in Ireland 
(Wren et al., 2015). 
 
3. UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE – DEFINITIONS, RATIONALE AND FINANCING 
3.1. What is Universality in Healthcare? 
Although an international consensus has developed about the merits of universal 
healthcare, the definition of universality can vary. The European Union (EU) has 
accepted ‘the overarching values of universality, access to good quality care, 
equity and solidarity’ as ‘the common values and principles that underpin 
Europe’s health systems’ (Council of the European Union, 2006: 1); while the 
World Health Organization (WHO) has advocated universal healthcare as the best 
means of improving global health (World Health Organization, 2015). There is 
overlap but not complete agreement between the EU and WHO definitions of 
universality. The EU articulates that:  
Universality means that no-one is barred access to health care; 
solidarity is closely linked to the financial arrangement of our 
national health systems and the need to ensure accessibility to all; 
equity relates to equal access according to need regardless of 
ethnicity, gender, age, social status or ability to pay (Council of the 
European Union, 2006: 2).  
 
The WHO defines its goal of universal health coverage (UHC) as ‘that all people 
receive the quality, essential health services they need, without being exposed to 
financial hardship’ (World Health Organization, 2015b: iv). 
 
The more conditional WHO definition of UHC mirrors the wording of the Irish 
1970 Health Act, which introduced the means-tested medical card scheme, with 
eligibility for medical cards to be limited to those who are ‘unable without undue 
hardship to arrange general practitioner medical and surgical services’ (Irish 
Statute Book: Health Act, 1970, Section 45). Notwithstanding this common 
phrasing, the values and associated ideologies informing the WHO policy and the 
current Irish system for non-cardholders are quite distinct. Libertarian principles, 
which regard access to healthcare as part of society’s reward system, are applied 
in the Irish system for access to primary care services by non-cardholders (Smith 
and Normand, 2011). In this system, health care is distributed by a private market 
according to willingness to pay so that individuals pay full market prices out-of-
pocket for GP and other primary care services (Smith and Normand, 2011). The 
WHO, on the other hand, has urged countries to reduce the extent of out-of-
pocket payment for health services at the point of delivery so that ‘no one should 
be denied health services, because they can’t afford to pay for them’ (World 
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Health Organization, 2015: 1). This focus on guaranteed access, with 
consumption of healthcare separated from payment for care, derives from the 
egalitarian ideologies which have informed the development of European 
healthcare systems (Smith and Normand, 2011) and are echoed in the 2011 
Programme for Government. While some countries with systems which are 
regarded as universal have an element of co-payment for GP and other primary 
care services, these systems are nonetheless based on egalitarian principles and 
are thus designed to ensure access to care in need so that such payments are 
relatively small; while in the libertarian Irish system, non-cardholders have no 
protection from the prevailing market rate. Consequently, in a study of primary 
care in 31 countries, non-cardholders in Ireland were found to have the highest 
payments for GP care (Kringos et al., 2013). 
 
Since countries which aspire to provide universal healthcare differ in the extent 
of universality that they achieve, the WHO has developed a framework to define 
and monitor the objectives and achievements of a universal system – the 
‘universal coverage cube’ (Figure 1) (World Health Organization, 2010; Kutzin, 
2013). First conceived by Busse et al. (2007), the cube captures a space with three 
dimensions: population coverage, service coverage and cost coverage. The 
aspiration of filling the cube as completely as possible is ‘best described by the 
founding principles of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1948: 
“universal, comprehensive, and free at the point of delivery”’ (Busse et al., 2007: 
1). As applied by the WHO, the cube identifies the proportion of the cost of 
services which is and is not covered by pooled funds (in effect taxation or some 
form of insurance) (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1  Three Dimensions to Consider When Moving Towards Universal Coverage 
 
Source:  World Health Organization, 2010. 
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Within the EU, most Member States provide universal coverage (the population 
axis) but with fiscal pressures, some countries have lowered scope (the services 
axis) and depth (the cost axis), which reduces the financial protection which 
universality is intended to achieve (Thomson et al., 2009). The description of a 
system as universal might be seen as aspirational, since countries with healthcare 
systems sharing that description achieve varying degrees of coverage. For 
example, in the tax-funded systems of Denmark, Sweden and Norway, universal 
coverage extends to publicly provided long-term care for older people, with little 
co-payment out-of-pocket, whereas in many other countries, with tax or social 
insurance-financed universal healthcare, long-term care is subject to means-tests 
and there can be substantial out-of-pocket payments (Fernández et al., 2009). 
Meanwhile in Israel, a system of national health insurance with compulsory 
enrolment (introduced in 1995), performs well in terms of population coverage, 
but the subsequent introduction of co-payments (Rosen and Samuel, 2009) has 
reduced the depth of coverage.  
 
While these countries have systems which aspire to universality, in the current 
Irish system, which does not aspire to universality, the practical consequence of 
the rejection of this European value can be seen in the relatively high financial 
barriers to access to GP care for a majority of the population; and in the recourse 
at times of fiscal crisis to measures which reduce population coverage (re-
introduction of means-testing for over 70s medical cards), services coverage 
(restrictions to social insurance-funded dental services) and cost coverage 
(introduction of prescription charges for medical cardholders). 
 
3.2. Why Universality in Healthcare? 
Countries adopt universal healthcare systems for a range of reasons. While 
proponents of universal healthcare perceive health as a value in itself (European 
Commission, 2013), the international consensus view of the desirability of 
universality in healthcare is further based on evidence about outcomes for 
individuals, society and the economy, with denial of access to care resulting in 
poorer health outcomes and a diminution in the potential of human capital. The 
EU recognizes health as a precondition for economic prosperity:  
Health expenditure is recognised as growth-friendly expenditure. 
Cost-effective and efficient health expenditure can increase the 
quantity and the productivity of labour by increasing healthy life 
expectancy (European Commission, 2013: 1).  
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Universality is promoted by the WHO for the further reason that UHC ‘is a 
powerful social equalizer and contributes to social cohesion and stability’ (World 
Health Organization, 2015b: iv). 
 
While it is acknowledged that health outcomes are influenced by many social, 
economic and genetic factors in addition to access to healthcare services 
(Dahlgren and Whitehead, 1991), the role of advances in medical treatment in 
improving human health and extending lifespan has been recognised in studies of 
improvements in health that have occurred over long time periods (Fogel and 
Costa, 1997; Cutler, 2001). Evidence of the beneficial effects on health outcomes 
of access to healthcare informs the support for universality of international 
bodies such as the European Commission and the WHO. Conversely, adverse 
effects on health outcomes from cost-sharing (or user fees) have been found in a 
number of studies (Swartz, 2010). Influential evidence that user fees prevent 
access to necessary healthcare emerged from the RAND health insurance 
experiment (HIE) in the US in the 1970s, which found that user out-of-pocket 
payments reduced the use of all types of healthcare services, deterring effective 
and ineffective treatments to the same extent (Shapiro et al., 1986) and reduced 
the demand for healthcare services more for low income groups, and in particular 
low income children (Lohr et al., 1986). These findings were subsequently 
replicated for other countries and systems (Kiil and Houlberg, 2014). 
 
In Ireland, O'Reilly et al. (2007) found that in the Republic, 18.9 per cent of 
patients (4.4 per cent of non-paying patients and 26.3 per cent of paying patients) 
had a medical problem in the previous year but had not consulted the doctor 
because of cost; this compared to 1.8 per cent of patients in Northern Ireland, 
with access to care free at the point of use. While theoretically, raising the 
means-test income threshold and extension of cards to those with diagnosed 
medical need might be expected to ameliorate such effects on access in need, in 
practice effective implementation of such changes within the current Irish system 
has proven difficult. Following controversy in 2014 over the operation of the 
system of discretionary medical cards based on combined income and health 
assessments (O'Regan, 2014), the Minister for Health Dr Leo Varadkar, 
concluded:  
The more that I have studied the issue of eligibility for medical cards, 
the more I have become convinced that the only solution is universal 
healthcare. No matter what means-test you apply, whether financial 
or medical, there will always be anomalies and there will always be 
people just above the threshold (Department of Health, 2014b). 
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3.3. How to Finance Universal Healthcare? 
Most countries adopt some combination of the four main approaches to 
financing health systems: general taxation, social insurance, private insurance 
and out-of-pocket payments. Systems of financing universal healthcare are 
identified by the predominant method of financing and most commonly follow 
one of two approaches. These two approaches can be broadly categorized as tax-
financed Beveridge systems or social insurance-financed Bismarckian systems. 
The Beveridge systems are named for Sir William Beveridge, author of the 
influential 1942 report which informed the introduction of the UK’s National 
Health Service (NHS). The Bismarckian systems are named for Count Otto von 
Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire who introduced the first system of 
compulsory health insurance in 1883.  
 
Under a general taxation, Beveridge system, everyone who pays taxes 
contributes to financing healthcare. Depending on the degree of universality, the 
entire population or segments of the population, have access to a range of 
publicly provided healthcare services (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). General 
revenues are generally the most equitable way to finance healthcare (Wagstaff et 
al., 1992), although the degree of equity will depend on the progressivity of a 
country’s tax system (Chinitz et al., 1998). Advantages of using general revenues 
to finance healthcare include a large scope for raising resources and potential for 
administrative efficiency and cost control; however, the adequacy of funding may 
be dependent on the outcome of annual budget discussions (Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006). General taxation revenues are used as a source of financing to 
some extent in most high-income countries and may supplement social insurance 
financing. 
 
Broadly Bismarckian social insurance systems finance universal healthcare in 
many western European countries including Belgium, France, Germany, Austria 
and Luxembourg. Although there is no clear definition of social insurance funding 
(Glied, 2008), Normand and Busse (2002) identify two crucial characteristics. 
First, insured people pay a regular, usually wage-based, contribution and, second, 
independent quasi-public bodies (usually called sickness funds) act as the major 
managing bodies of the system and as payers for healthcare (Normand and 
Busse, 2002). Otherwise, social insurance systems differ along a number of 
dimensions including the number and size of health funds, the system of risk 
equalisation, premia, ceilings on contributions, the financing of vulnerable 
groups, choice of provider, the mix of providers and the degree (if any) of 
contracting. An advantage of social insurance-based systems is that they deliver 
an earmarked fund for healthcare, which affords a transparent view of the link 
between contributions and expenditure and which may therefore enhance 
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support among citizens for contributing to necessary healthcare expenditures 
(Thomas et al., 2006). 
 
Reliance on private health insurers as the primary vehicle for mandatory health 
insurance in a universal system is a feature of the system in the Netherlands, 
which is unusual internationally. Competing, for-profit insurers within a multi-
payer system may be more cost-inflationary because marketing costs and profit 
drive up cost. Mathauer and Nicolle (2011), in an examination of administrative 
costs for social security (encompassing social insurance systems) and private 
health insurance schemes across high income OECD countries, found that, on 
average, private health insurance administrative costs were three times higher 
than those of social security schemes. They noted that while the rationale for 
competition is increased efficiency (assuming administrative costs would 
decrease because competition would force insurers to be more efficient in their 
insurance management), the level of competition is often limited so that the 
anticipated effect is not observed in practice. A further potential efficiency gain 
from competing insurers, in theory, is that competition between insurers would 
increase efficiency in delivery and drive down the cost of services. To achieve 
these efficiencies, people should be able to switch insurer with ease; competition 
should be based on price and quality rather than risk selection; and insurers 
should have access to tools that allow them to influence healthcare quality and 
costs and be willing to use them (Thomson et al., 2013). However, there is 
evidence that in the Netherlands, some of these conditions are not met 
(Thomson et al., 2013). 
 
4. THE WHITE PAPER MODEL OF UHI 
4.1. Model Design 
Under the White Paper proposals, UHI would finance aspects of primary and 
hospital care, while programmes such as long-term and community care for older 
people and people with disabilities and long-stay mental health care would 
remain tax-financed.3 Under the proposed system, every member of the 
population would be insured for the same package of healthcare services, with 
individuals purchasing insurance for this standard package from one of a number 
of competing health insurers (Department of Health, 2014). Financial support 
would be available to ensure affordability by directly paying or subsidising from 
taxation the cost of insurance premia for people on lower incomes. The proposed 
system would entail a purchaser-provider split with the purchasing of primary 
and hospital care largely devolved to insurers. Health insurers would purchase 
 
                                                          
3  In Ireland, no distinction is made between public health and social care programmes, which are funded from the 
same voted expenditure or health budget. 
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care for their members from primary care providers, independent not-for-profit 
hospital trusts and private hospitals. Insurers would be free to engage in selective 
contracting with healthcare providers. As part of the transition to UHI, a model 
for financing public hospital care based on Money Follows the Patient (MFTP) was 
proposed involving a shift from the current block grant budgets with minor 
adjustment for the volume and complexity of activity to a new system where 
hospitals are paid for the actual level of activity.  
 
4.2. White Paper Model, the Universal Coverage Cube and Equity 
The White Paper model was in places ambiguous and unclear so that, separate 
from its cost implications, its potential efficacy in achieving the egalitarian aims of 
the Programme for Government of access according to need and payment 
according to ability to pay was unclear. The unclear aspects of the White Paper 
proposals are obstacles to applying the WHO framework of the universal 
coverage cube to analyse the degree of universality in this proposed system. The 
White Paper stated that the Government would introduce legislation setting out  
the entitlement of every person, regardless of personal 
characteristics and status, to universal coverage for a comprehensive 
basket of health services and the obligation to contribute to the cost 
of services, in proportion to ability to pay (Department of Health, 
2014: 8).  
 
However, although full coverage of the population was envisaged, the extent of 
services to be included in the standard insured package or basket was unclear; so 
that while the population dimension would be broad, the proposed dimension of 
service coverage could be shallow (Figure 2). Further, the extent to which out-of-
pocket charges would remain was also uncertain: the Department of Health 
envisaged that, for instance, Emergency Department (ED) charges would remain 
(Wren et al., 2015). To the degree that services such as ED care or prescribed 
medications remained outside the insured basket and therefore outside the 
service coverage dimension, the current out-of-pocket payments could remain 
(Department of Health, 2014) so that the height of the cost coverage dimension 
was also uncertain.  
 
Notwithstanding the commitment to egalitarian principles, in this proposed 
system design neither equity of access nor payment according to ability to pay 
was guaranteed. The White Paper, for instance, stated that subject to certain 
quality and geographic coverage rules, insurers would be free to engage in 
selective contracting with healthcare providers, which would allow insurers to 
offer different types of UHI policies, offering a greater or lesser choice of 
healthcare providers, and with differing levels of excess (Department of Health, 
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2014). The White Paper did not elaborate on how the potential conflict between 
these aspects of the proposed model would be reconciled with provision of equal 
access based on need rather than ability to pay. To the degree that this model 
would not achieve equitable access to the services covered by UHI, this would 
diminish the extent of universality in the service coverage dimension of this 
proposed system; to the degree that differing levels of excess (unreimbursed 
expenditures) would apply, this would reduce the cost coverage dimension. 
 
FIGURE 2  White Paper UHI Model in Universal Cost Coverage Cube 
 
Source:  Developed by authors based on Figure 1, World Health Organization (2010). 
 
Tax-financing for the high proportion of services which were envisaged as 
remaining outside the UHI basket, combined with the anticipated extent of tax 
subsidy for the UHI system, explored in analysis by Callan et al. (2015), would 
have the effect that overall healthcare financing would still derive more from 
taxation than UHI premia.4 Thus, the achievement of payment according to ability 
to pay would depend on the progressivity of the tax system in addition to the 
level of the UHI premium, the design of the subsidy system and the extent to 
which out-of-pocket payments would remain. 
 
 
                                                          
4  Even in the case of the relatively more comprehensive UHI-financed Basket 3 (covering hospital, primary, and mental 
health care and prescribed medications) examined in the core findings of Wren et al. (2015), public current 
expenditure on programmes outside the UHI basket, on administration and on public pensions would account for 
€6.3 billion or approximately 46 per cent of the €13.5 billion Health Service Executive (HSE) gross non-capital 
expenditure in 2013. 
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4.3. Methods in Analysis of Potential Costs of the White Paper Model 
of UHI 
The Wren et al (2015) analysis of the cost implications of the White Paper model 
of UHI necessarily adopted assumptions about a large number of the ill-defined 
aspects of the model: the contents of the UHI-financed basket of services; the 
nature of the premium and subsidy systems; the payment mechanisms for health 
professionals; and, crucially, the degree to which private insurers would continue 
to operate in a private market, governed by EU and Irish competition law. 
Informed by primary data analysis and the international evidence, the Wren et al. 
(2015) study further adopted assumptions about the dynamic effects on the 
behaviour of individuals and organisations of the removal of payment at the point 
of delivery for health services and of the purchasing of services by multiple, 
private insurers. Thus, assumptions were adopted about: increased service 
demand to meet hitherto unmet need; higher transaction costs for hospitals 
contracting with multiple payers; efficiency gains driven by insurer purchasing of 
hospital care; efficiency gains from changing skill-mix in primary care; and 
potential increased remuneration of GPs (Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1  Key Assumptions in Modelling Effects on Healthcare Expenditure of White Paper UHI Model  
Scenario  Evidence  Assumed effect on UHI-financed 
services 
Insurers’ Margin  Health Insurance Authority’s reports on risk 
equalisation (HIA, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014)  
Addition of minimum market 
mean margin of 7.5%; maximum 
14.2%; mean 2010-2013 9.9%  
Unmet Need  EU-SILC (2013) 4.8% report unmet need 
O’Reilly et al. (2007) 18.9% do not visit GP due to 
cost 
4% or 10% expenditure increase 
Transaction costs  Himmelstein et al. (2014) cost of hospital 
administration: 15.5% England; 19.8% Netherlands; 
difference applied to Ireland 
4.3% increased hospital costs  
Efficiency gains 
Hospitals  
HIPE (2012) mean length of stay (LOS) of surgical 
inpatients: uninsured 7.3 days; insured 6.3 days 
14% reduction surgical LOS with 
all patients dropping to insured 
mean 
Efficiency gains 
Primary care  
Cupples et al. (2008) Ratio GP: nurse visits in 
Northern Ireland lower than Republic of Ireland  
Reduced expenditure on GP care 
due more delivery by nurses 
Increased GP 
visiting  
Analysis based on survey evidence (TILDA, GUI, LII) 
of extent of increased GP visiting when individuals 
no longer face fees 
Increased expenditure on GP care 
to reimburse GPs for higher 
demand 
GMS payments 
rate basis  
Application variants of prevailing GP payment rates 
for medical cardholders to non-cardholders  
Increased expenditure on GP care 
applying prevailing GMS rates 
 
Source:  Developed from Wren et al (2015) and further discussed in (Connolly et al., forthcoming) and (Wren et al., 2016, forthcoming). 
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The Wren et al. (2015) analysis adopted a societal perspective of cost: analysing 
the level of and sources of finance for total expenditure on healthcare in Ireland 
in 2013; analysing the sources of finance for services which might be financed by 
UHI; and then examining the effects on total and per capita health expenditure of 
the introduction of UHI for a range of eight potential and progressively more 
comprehensive baskets of services. Thus UHI-financing was substituted in this 
analysis for tax-financing, PHI-financing and out-of-pocket financing for services 
within the UHI basket, and the insurers’ market margin (broadly expenses plus 
profit)5 was assumed to apply to all UHI-financed services. This latter assumption 
was informed by legal advice to the Department of Health that competition law 
would continue to apply to private health insurers (Wren et al., 2015), 
notwithstanding a Programme for Government commitment that the UHI system 
should be designed to remain outside the competition law remit as in many 
European systems of statutory social insurance. The 9.9 per cent market mean 
insurers’ margin for the years 2010 to 2013 and the top and bottom of the 
market mean range of those years of 7.5 and 14.2 per cent were applied in 
alternative scenarios in the analysis (Table 1). At the request of the Department 
of Health, the main findings of the analysis focused on three baskets of UHI-
financed services (Table 2). A range of estimates of the effect of the proposed 
model on health expenditure were derived reflecting differing assumptions, with 
the main findings focusing on two scenarios combining assumptions of: lower or 
higher increases in the volume and cost of services to meet unmet need; lower or 
higher costs of delivery of free GP care; and lower or higher insurers’ margins 
(Table 3). 
 
TABLE 2  Services in Assumed UHI-Financed Baskets in Central Findings of Wren et al. (2015) 
  Basket 1 Basket 2 Basket 3 
In
cl
ud
ed
 se
rv
ic
es
  Hospital care     
Mental health care     
GP care     
Other primary care     
Prescribed medications     
 
 
 
                                                          
5  The insurers’ margin is the term used in Wren et al (2015) to describe the margin between insurers’ earned premium 
income and their expenditure on claims incurred and is comprised of: expenses and the cost of reinsurance; and 
underwriting profit or loss plus the impact of investments, which sum to profit before tax. 
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TABLE 3  Assumptions in Two Scenarios in Central Findings of Wren et al. (2015) 
Assumptions  Scenario 1: 
Low Unmet Need/ 
Average Insurers’ Margin  
Scenario 2: 
High Unmet Need/ High GP Cost/  
High Insurers’ Margin  
Unmet Need  4% increased volume and cost of 
services to address unmet need  
10% increased volume and cost of 
services to address unmet need  
Hospital costs  Increased transaction costs but 
efficiency gains  
Increased transaction costs but 
efficiency gains  
Cost of GP care  4% increase applied to cost of GP 
care for former non-cardholders, 
reflecting unmet need assumption 
Higher GP remuneration 
Insurers’ margin 9.9% 14.2% 
 
 
4.4. Findings from Analysis of Potential Costs of the White Paper 
Model of UHI 
The potential effect of the introduction of this system of UHI on estimated total 
healthcare expenditure of €19.2 billion in 2013 was found to be an increase of 
between €666 million to €2,055 million, or 3.5 to 10.7 per cent. This range of 
findings reflects the basket and the scenario adopted, with the lower end of the 
range applying to Basket 1 and Scenario 1 and the upper end to Basket 3 and 
Scenario 2 (Tables 2 and 3). These findings translate into a mean per capita UHI 
cost, equivalent to the mean UHI premium, ranging from €1,600 to €2,509. This 
range of the mean UHI premium compares to a mean PHI premium of €1,104 in 
2013,6 with the higher mean UHI premium reflecting the broader service 
coverage of the UHI basket, an increased volume of services to address unmet 
need and the additional costs arising from the insurance financing system. There 
are partially offsetting reductions in per capita tax, PHI and out-of-pocket 
payments for healthcare, reflecting the shift to UHI-financing for some services. 
The analysis does not assume a flat-rate UHI premium levied on all members of 
the population. Subsidies from Government to insurers for people on lower 
incomes would be financed by taxation (Callan et al., 2015) and the UHI premia 
for adults, children and students would likely differ (KPMG, 2015). In sensitivity 
analysis, this research found that, on most assumptions, the insurers’ margin was 
the greatest contributor to additional healthcare costs in the White Paper model 
of UHI financing, with a higher assumed insurers’ margin leading to higher 
percentage increases in healthcare expenditure. The estimated cost of the UHI 
model of financing (from the combination of the insurers’ margin and additional 
transaction costs) was found in general to exceed the estimated costs to address 
unmet need, which would be expected to arise in a universal system, however 
 
                                                          
6  The mean PHI premium is calculated by dividing total open membership undertakings’ premium income by the 
number of people with private health insurance inpatient cover in the year from Health Insurance Authority (2015). 
The mean PHI premium increased from €1,008 in 2012 to €1,104 in 2013 and €1,144 in 2014. 
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financed. The authors acknowledged uncertainty in the unmet need estimates 
and recommended further research in this area. 
 
5. ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE TO UNIVERSAL 
HEALTHCARE 
The Government response to the publication of this analysis was that the costs of 
the White Paper UHI model were ‘not acceptable’ (Department of Health, 2015). 
Coming so late in the life of the Government, this rejection of the model by its 
proponent on cost grounds alone effectively curtailed debate on any offsetting 
merits that the model might have, on other deficiencies in its design or on 
adaptations that might reduce the costs or address other deficiencies. A case 
might have been made by proponents of the model that it would deliver 
equitable access to care and remove barriers to accessing hospital care faced by 
the non-insured and barriers to accessing GP care for non-cardholders. The high 
cost of delivering this access via multiple, competing insurers might then have 
been assessed relative to the achievements of these objectives. Yet, as discussed 
above, the achievement of equitable access and the removal of financial barriers 
to accessing care would not necessarily follow from this model design. The 
provision for selective contracting by insurers with providers and the proposed 
latitude for insurers to have differing levels of excess (unreimbursed 
expenditures) could obviate against equitable access according to need with 
payment according to ability to pay. Furthermore, the degree to which out-of-
pocket payments for essential care could remain in this UHI system design would 
diminish the extent of its achievement of universality. 
 
It appears from the deficiencies and contradictions in the design of the White 
Paper UHI model, that the financing mechanism had been perceived as an end in 
itself rather than a means to an end. Aspects of the design appear informed by a 
misconception that achieving universal private health insurance would be 
synonymous with achieving universality in healthcare. Quite apart from the 
expenditure implications, the continuation of features of the PHI system, such as 
insurers’ freedom to charge differing levels of excess, for instance, are 
incompatible with a system designed to ensure payment according to ability to 
pay. The commitment to this financing model may in part have reflected a belief 
that it would achieve secondary objectives such as increasing efficiencies in 
delivery via managed competition. As discussed, the evidence for this effect of 
competition between insurers in the healthcare market is, however, weak 
(Thomson et al., 2013). It would depend on a willingness of consumers to switch 
insurers in response to increased premia and of insurers to contract selectively. 
Neither is a common feature of universal systems and both would obviate against 
ensuring equal access and payment according to ability to pay. 
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The shelving of this particular model affords an opportunity for refinement of the 
design of an Irish pathway to universal healthcare. In addition to committing to 
reaching a decision on how best to finance universal healthcare in its 2016 
Programme, the new Government committed to requesting an Oireachtas All-
Party committee to develop a plan for healthcare over a ten-year period, with 
‘cross party consensus on healthcare planning and a shared vision’ (Department 
of the Taoiseach, 2016: 63). Although development of such a comprehensive 
roadmap to universality is beyond the scope of this paper, we now examine 
issues which require consideration in any alternative design. These include: the 
objectives of the reform; the mechanisms to be adopted to achieve the reform; 
the cost-effectiveness of the reform design; and the feasibility of the reform in an 
Irish context. We briefly consider these issues in turn. 
 
5.1. Universality as an Objective of Reform 
If the objective of the reform is to achieve universal healthcare, the dimensions of 
the WHO universal coverage cube afford a framework in which to examine any 
proposed universal system. Fundamentally, such systems have in common the 
intent to remove financial barriers to accessing care by the creation of some form 
of pre-paid pooled fund or funds, which could be achieved by taxation, social 
insurance or, less commonly, with a central role for private health insurers. The 
extent of financial protection and universal coverage depends on the proportion 
of necessary services that are financed from the fund or funds; the breadth of 
population coverage; and, crucially, the degree of limitation or removal of out-of-
pocket payments required to access necessary healthcare. The mechanism to 
pool funds – the financing mechanism – is secondary to the objective of 
universality in this framework. If the objective is further framed as to achieve 
equitable access determined by need, then complex eligibility rules and tiers are 
to be avoided. If payment is to be according to ability to pay, then progressive 
taxation or pay-related social insurance afford simpler routes to achieving this 
than a complex mixture of private health insurance premia, tax subsidy and 
general taxation. 
 
5.2. Mechanisms to Achieve Universality 
The financing mechanism to achieve universality is only one aspect of the system 
design. Within social insurance systems, for instance, there are those with 
multiple insurance funds and single funds. Within tax-financed systems, there can 
be a single state purchaser of care (such as the HSE in Ireland) or multiple 
purchasers (as introduced in the UK’s NHS in the 1990s). Delivery may be largely 
public, largely private and is frequently a mixture. The choice of financing 
mechanisms or the form of delivery of care is likely to be a product of the cultural 
 
19 
values and historical evolution of institutions in a country. Minimising system 
disruption and additional cost while maximising universal coverage would be 
desirable criteria for the design of such mechanisms for Ireland. Universal 
coverage may become universal rationing, however, if supply cannot increase to 
meet demand, and mechanisms are therefore necessary to ensure access in need 
even within universal systems. These may be guarantees of access with minimum 
acceptable waits, supported by a fund to purchase care nationally or 
internationally to prevent these wait times being exceeded. 
 
5.3. How to Ensure a Cost-Effective System? 
The insurers’ market margin was found to be the major driver of the additional 
costs arising in the White Paper model. Application of the full market margin to 
UHI-financed expenditure was assumed in Wren et al. (2015) because of 
unpublished, legal advice to the Department of Health that EU competition law 
would apply. Yet, within the European Union, countries have implemented 
universal systems financed by varying mechanisms, including forms of insurance, 
which remain outside competition law, thereby giving government much greater 
control over factors such as pricing, cost control and insurers’ margins. The 
critical distinction in ensuring that a system is outside the scope of EU 
competition law is that it should be designed according to principles of social 
solidarity with equal access to services irrespective of ability to pay (Prosser, 
2010). In the design of an alternative system, such a requirement would need to 
be met so that an Irish Government could control costs. However, there remain 
challenges in ensuring that a system designed to ensure equitable access does 
not lose this protection from competition law requirements due to the mixed 
economy nature of its provision or financing (Prosser, 2010). It appears that an 
Irish Government intent on a major healthcare reform would be well-advised to 
engage actively with the European Commission to ensure parity of treatment for 
the new Irish system with pre-EU legacy systems, which may have remained 
outside the scope of EU law because they existed prior to its development. 
 
Whatever the financing system, to ensure cost-effective delivery of universal 
healthcare in Ireland, payment mechanisms for professionals and healthcare 
providers should be designed to mitigate against supplier-induced demand (SID). 
Fee-for-service (FFS) payments, such as pertain in the Irish privately insured 
sector, incentivise the supply of more care, which may have the opposite effect 
to user fees, encouraging both necessary and unnecessary care (Robinson, 2001). 
An escalation of insured activity and cost in the rapidly growing, private 
insurance-financed private hospital sector in Ireland noted by McLoughlin (2014) 
would suggest that there should be detailed analysis of, and like-with-like 
comparison of, patient-level data in the private and public hospital sectors to 
clarify whether SID is a significant driver of private insurance costs in Ireland 
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before committing to a route to universal access financed via health insurers. In 
contrast, the current extension of access to GP care without fees, within the 
framework of the existing medical card system of capitation payment for GPs 
(supplemented by other forms of payment), is not associated with this risk. 
 
A further consideration in designing provider reimbursement systems is to 
encourage providers to provide appropriate care in the appropriate setting. A 
capitation payment system may be associated with lower total costs than fee-for-
service, because providers promote long-term preventive healthcare since 
additional activity represents an additional cost to the provider. Providers also 
have an incentive to seek alternative, possibly less expensive, providers of care, 
such as practice nurse substitution for GPs. However, system design must guard 
against the risk that capitation payment may encourage practitioners to hold 
larger patient list sizes in order to maximise income, which may result in a higher 
workload and shorter consultations (Gosden et al., 2000).  
 
The recent publication of revised Irish healthcare expenditure data according to 
the definitions of the OECD System of Health Accounts (SHA), while preliminary, 
nonetheless suggests that total Irish health expenditure is high relative to many 
other OECD countries (OECD.Stat; Central Statistics Office, 2015). The reasons for 
this apparently relatively high expenditure require further research, examining 
for instance, whether the Irish system’s complex combination of the privately 
insured sector and means-tested and rationed public sector fosters cost-
inflationary features like high transaction costs and SID, which are associated 
with predominantly private-insurance based systems. Detailed analysis of the 
drivers of cost in Irish healthcare – private and public – should be a prerequisite 
to the design of a cost-effective universal system. 
 
5.4. Feasible Routes to Universality 
No two countries’ healthcare systems are identical and a successful Irish reform is 
likely to have its own distinct features built on the existing system. It is 
noteworthy that the aspect of the 2011-2016 Government’s reform programme, 
which advanced during its term, was the extension of free GP care, using the 
existing tax-financed GP Visit card system. This extension of coverage for young 
children will facilitate the roll out of new public health measures, such as wellness 
checks, at relatively low cost to the Exchequer and very low cost to Irish society, 
when the removal of private fees for this grouping is taken into account (Wren et 
al., 2015). The potential to build universal primary care from the existing tax-
financed system at relatively low cost (Wren et al., 2015; Connolly et al., 
forthcoming) is a pragmatic argument for continuing on this tax-financed 
pathway, whether by progressively extending cover on age or income criteria. 
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The case for an alternative pathway, changing either the financing or delivery 
systems for primary care, would need to be supported by evidence of lower costs 
or greater cost-effectiveness. 
Paradoxically, in hospital care in Ireland the case for universality and pre-
payment has already been accepted in principle, notwithstanding the inequities 
in access. Public hospital care became a universal system, pre-paid by taxation, 
from 1979 in the case of accommodation and 1991 in the case of consultant care 
(Wren, 2003), albeit subsequently attenuated by overnight and Emergency 
Department charges. Private health insurance is a further system of pre-payment. 
It is the nature of the co-existence of the two systems which has created two-tier 
access, with the insured achieving faster access to the universal public system. 
Whatever the financing mechanism, the prerequisites to develop a universal 
hospital care system are adequate resourcing of acute hospital care and equitable 
access to it. Although an argument can be made for achieving equity by 
introducing a purely tax-financed NHS-style system, this pathway requires a 
policy to address the sizeable, state-subsidised private hospital and private health 
insurance sectors. An alternative pathway to a system, which could reconcile tax 
and insurance-financing of equitable access to public and private hospital care, 
would be to develop the model of the National Treatment Purchase Fund 
purchase of private care for people on public waiting lists. In a step to 
universality, which would not require financing system change, this model could 
be expanded to a guarantee of equitable access to care with a separation of 
the purchaser and provider roles in the public healthcare system – a public 
purchaser pathway to equitable access.  
Alternatively, a private purchaser pathway to equitable hospital access could be 
pursued in a limited and re-conceived version of the White Paper UHI model. 
Wren et al (2015) examined the cost of applying the White Paper model to the 
purchase of inpatient and daycase hospital care only in the least comprehensive 
of the eight baskets examined, which was not reported in the core findings of this 
study discussed above. On the assumptions outlined in the previous section 
(which may be conservative in their assessment of unmet need and which do not 
include an assessment of potential SID), financing these aspects of hospital care 
via multiple, competing insurers would add from €417 million to €741 million or 
2.2 to 3.9 per cent to total healthcare expenditure. If the system were re-
designed to allow control of insurers’ margins, this cost would reduce. Insurers’ 
margins on UHI-financed services, which were formerly tax or out-of-pocket 
financed, constitute over 60 per cent of this additional spending. The cost of such 
an approach to equitable access could be further reduced were it only required to 
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finance elective care, which is the aspect of hospital care to which two-tier access 
applies. Elective care is increasingly delivered via day procedures and elective 
discharges account for only 20 per cent of inpatient discharges from public 
hospitals, with the remainder arising from emergency admissions (Healthcare 
Pricing Office, 2014). 
 
Since the issue of two-tier access in the Irish system arises in acute hospital care 
and is in essence a problem of two queues for elective care, it should be possible 
to design a pragmatic pathway to universality in this aspect of care, based on 
either a public or private purchaser pathway. Either could be founded on the 
existing system and tailored to address this issue of access alone, without the 
much wider financing shifts and risks and the institutional upheaval implicit in the 
White Paper model. Careful design of payment systems would be essential to 
avoid SID and adequate capacity would be required to address unmet need. If 
either pathway were contemplated, its design should of course be subject to 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, which would assess the costs of the system change 
relative to the potential gains in health outcomes, equity and system efficiency; 
and relative to alternative pathways to universality. 
 
Analysis of potential stakeholder resistance to steps on a pathway to universality 
such as those discussed is beyond the scope of this paper. Historically, opponents 
of health system reform in Ireland have included the Catholic Church and medical 
professionals, an institution and a professional group which have evolved beyond 
such monolithic opposition to change (Wren, 2003). The Irish Medical 
Organisation (IMO), for instance, advanced the case for a universal healthcare 
system in 2010 (Irish Medical Organisation, 2010). The egalitarian values 
expressed in the 2011 Programme for Government’s commitment to social 
solidarity are evidence of a parallel evolution in Irish politics towards support for 
European values in healthcare. This commitment to social solidarity survived the 
change of Government, as evidenced in cross-party support for an Oireachtas 
Committee, to be established by a Dáil motion ‘recognising… the need to 
establish a universal single-tier service where patients are treated on the basis of 
health rather than on ability to pay’ (Department of Health, 2016). 
 
This development in Irish politics appears to represent a convergence to the EU 
view that society, the economy and individuals gain from social solidarity in 
health system design. While holders of private health insurance are potential 
losers from a reform which achieves equitable access to public hospital elective 
care, unless supply is sufficient to meet demand, they are however likely to be 
among the potential winners from universal free GP care. If reform were 
accompanied by better resourced public hospitals, the insured and the uninsured 
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would benefit from more timely access to emergency non-elective care. Insured 
status is no protection from long waits on trolleys in Irish public hospital 
Emergency Departments. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The historic commitment of the 2011-2016 Programme for Government in 
Ireland to a universal system with access to care based on need and payment 
according to ability to pay was not realised in many concrete achievements 
during the Government’s term. Although coverage of GP care free at the point of 
delivery was extended to young children and re-instated for people aged 70 and 
over, other measures reduced the dimensions of universality in the Irish system. 
While the Government abandoned the proposed White Paper model of UHI on 
grounds of cost, when we assess the design of the model with reference to the 
WHO’s universal coverage cube, we find that had it been implemented, it could 
have increased costs without necessarily achieving universality and equitable 
access. 
 
In place of this policy which appeared to be based on a misconception that 
universal private health insurance was synonymous with universality in 
healthcare, future policy should aim to increase the dimensions of universal 
coverage (population coverage, services coverage and pooled payment to replace 
user fees), while building from the existing Irish system in the most cost-effective 
way possible. While acknowledging that development of a comprehensive 
roadmap to universality is beyond the scope of this paper, we have explored 
some potential routes to advancing towards universality, including: the extension 
of the present tax-financed primary care system: and addressing two-tier access 
to hospital care by either a new public purchaser of hospital care or introducing 
compulsory private insurance for elective hospital care in a system designed to 
ensure payment according to ability to pay and Government control of insurers’ 
margins and other costs. 
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